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In a variety of open source software projects, we document a superlinear growth
of production (R ∼ cβ) as a function of the number of active developers c, with
β ≃ 4/3 with large dispersions. For a typical project in this class, doubling of the
group size multiplies typically the output by a factor 2β = 2.5, explaining the title.
This superlinear law is found to hold for group sizes ranging from 5 to a few hundred
developers. We propose two classes of mechanisms, interaction-based and large devi-
ation, along with a cascade model of productive activity, which unifies them. In this
common framework, superlinear productivity requires that the involved social groups
function at or close to criticality, in the sense of a subtle balance between order and
disorder. We report the first empirical test of the renormalization of the exponent
of the distribution of the sizes of first generation events into the renormalized expo-
nent of the distribution of clusters resulting from the cascade of triggering over all
generation in a critical branching process in the non-meanfield regime. Finally, we
document a size effect in the strength and variability of the superlinear effect, with
2smaller groups exhibiting widely distributed superlinear exponents, some of them
characterizing highly productive teams. In contrast, large groups tend to have a
smaller superlinearity and less variability.
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3I. INTRODUCTION
Since at least Aristotle, the adage in the title has permeated human thinking, with promi-
nent influence in psychology (Gestalt theory [1]), biology (brain functions [2], ecological net-
works [3]), physics (spontaneous symmetry breaking [4] and the “more is different” concept
[5]), economics [6, 7] among a wealth of other examples. Prominent among other develop-
ments are the fields of complexity science, synergetics and complex adaptive system theory,
which strive to understand natural and social systems in terms of a systemic or holistic
approach, where the above adage is translated into the scientific concept of emergence that
results from repetitive interactions between simple constituting elements in extended out-
of-equilibrium adaptive systems. Dealing with groups such as firms and production units,
management science also strives to understand when and how a group can be more than the
sum of individuals, and to design ways to improve team performance [8–11], through the
mechanism of complementarity in organization [12, 13] and innovations [14]. Because most
activities in our modern environment require coordination and collaborative actions within
groups of widely varying sizes, it is the dream of any manager, be it in the public or private
sector, to find the gears that could enhance productivity.
Notwithstanding their importance in human culture and civilization since ancient times,
we still have a limited understanding of the mechanisms at the origin of group productiv-
ity. Moreover, we do not really understand the conditions under which the whole is more
than the sum of its parts, and how to quantify its productivity with respect to its different
constituents. The bottlenecks hindering progress include the difficulties for quantifying pro-
ductivity as well as the obstacles of controlled experiments that allow for clean conclusions.
Indeed, most human groups and systems are entangled in their functioning and objectives,
and are rarely amenable to systematic and continuous observations suitable for rigorous
scientific analyses.
To address these problems, we use a source of data in which group cooperation is ubiq-
uitous and can be quantified in great details, namely the dynamics of production during
the development of open source software (OSS) projects. Because OSS development is
essentially collective, iterative, and cumulative, and the overhead costs for interactions is
small thanks to the cheap electronic support mediating exchanges between developers, the
study of potential increases of productivity by interaction and cooperation between several
4contributing developers is particularly well suited.
Section II presents the main empirical evidence of the superlinear production law found for
open source software projects. Section III presents two classes of mechanisms at the origin
of superlinear production, which are unified in the cascade model of productive activity.
Empirical data tests are found to support the model. Section IV compares and attempts
to reconcile present findings for OSS and the superlinear law previously reported for cities.
Section V discusses our results, and Section VI concludes.
II. QUANTIFICATION OF PRODUCTIVITY IN OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE
PROJECTS
We have analyzed the production for 164 open source software projects of size ranging
from 5 to 1678 contributors. Figure 1 shows the complementary cumulative distribution of
project sizes in our sample quantified by the number of developers involved in each project.
The distribution is an approximate power law P>(S) := Pr(size > S) ∼ 1/S
α with exponent
α ≈ 1.4, which reflects a large heterogeneity of project sizes with few projects attracting
many developers and a multitude of projects with just a few developers. The simplest
generic mechanism for such power law distribution of human group sizes is proportional
growth coupled with birth and death [15, 16] as verified empirically in OSS package reuse
[17], in group [18] and in product [19] dynamics.
A first idea would be to quantify the total production (for instance proxied by the number
of lines of code, commits or the number of packages) of each software and search for a
relationship with the total number of involved developers over the whole project. This
is misleading because the total output results from a complex interplay between a time
varying numbers of involved developers and the intermittent duration and intensity of their
contributions. In the extreme limit, a single developer working over a lifetime may produce
as much as tens or even hundreds of developers over a few months. The large variability
of developer numbers and contributions as a function of time for each project is illustrated
by Figure 2, which shows the intermittent dynamics of active contributors as well as their
productive activity as a function of time (in logarithmic scales).
To capture more faithfully the actions of contributions via cooperation, we propose to
focus on short-term production and group sizes. For each project, we partition its lifetime
5in time windows of a fixed size that we shift over the whole project duration. We then
quantify the production in each window and study its relation to the number of active
developers during that same time window. As proxies for the production of developers, we
could use either use lines of codes (LOCs) or commits. LOCs are straightforward metrics
but suffer from the criticism that real production and quality is not in general proportional
to the number of code lines. Indeed, excellent contributions are in general characterized
by efficient and elegant coding associated with conciseness. Among software developers,
it is well recognized that the number of LOCs contributed is not a predictor of quality.
However, in open collaboration, each innovation step can be seen as a commit uploaded
and compounded on an online repository, which keeps track of all changes over time. Each
commit reflects the contributor’s commitment to expose to the community her proposed
solution to an open problem. Commits are the elementary units that get peer-reviewed,
tested and eventually integrated in the project knowledge base. Thus, they are a direct
measure of the iterative productive process at work in peer-production. All commit activities
are parsimoniously indexed and timestamped on the project repository.
Notwithstanding these arguments in favor of using commits as metrics of production, it
is useful to test for a possible relation between LOCs and Commits. Figure 3 documents
a robust scaling relationship LOCs ∼ (Commits)δ, with exponents δ ' 1 for most of the
projects. These findings shown in Figure 3 bolster our confidence in the robustness of the
findings reported below, which should not be sensitive to the specific choice of the metric
for production.
Figure 4 demonstrates the typical superlinear relationship
R ∼ cβ (1)
where the production R is defined as the total number of commits measured per 5-day time
windows for the Apache Web Server (http://httpd.apache.org/) and c is the number of
active contributors in the same 5-day time windows. Contrary to the naive expectation that
the production R should be proportional to the number c of developers, Figure 4 documents
a superlinear relationship with exponent β ≈ 1.5 ± 0.1, therefore significantly larger than
the value 1 describing a simple proportionality R ∝ c. Over all OSS projects studied, the
estimated statistical average is βˆ ≈ 4/3. Since 24/3 = 2.5, this explains the title of this
paper. For many projects, β is larger than 4/3, such as the Apache Web Server project
6shown in figure 4, for which 21.5 = 2.8.
III. MECHANISMS FOR SUPERLINEAR PRODUCTION
We consider two classes of mechanisms for superlinear production.
A. Interaction-based mechanism for superlinear production
There is a variety of channels by which contributors commit more solutions to problems
when the community is more active. The peer-review process is more likely to occur when
more contributors are active, there are incentives to share early with the community to avoid
redundant work and some problems require collective intelligence to increase their chance
to be solved [20], because they require tight coordination among different technical parts
of the code [21]. When interactions occur, the observed increasing return of productive
activity implies that the change dR/dc of productivity upon the addition of a developer
due to the existence of interactions is not a constant but grows itself with the number
of active contributors (as ∼ cβ−1 with β > 1). There is thus a remarkable increase of
productive activity, not only as the sum of increased individual commits, but also as a result
of interactions among active contributors. In standard models of interaction, linearity is the
rule (β = 1) and superlinearity is only obtained when triggering of action is close to criticality
[22–25], when one action triggers on average one follow-up action, ensuring that the dynamics
remains delicately poised between growth and decay. Criticality is indeed characterized by a
superlinear dependence of the response function as a function of the driving field. Interpreted
in the present context, the response function is the total production and the driving field
is the number of active developers. Therefore, an explanation of superlinear productivity
by the interaction-based mechanism requires elucidating under which circumstances open
source projects operate close to or at criticality. The study of dynamics of book sales [26, 27]
and YouTube videos views [28] has shown evidence of these critical triggering effects in large
social networks. Open source projects and their online communication platforms coupled
with the code repository serve a similar social network role yet at much smaller scales [29, 30].
Since these above analyses as well as those presented here benefit from the survival bias, in
other words the analyses are performed on top performers among a much larger database,
7the existence of criticality in these system can be interpreted as the signature of a degree
of success quantified by significant activity. Specifically, considering a large universe of
projects, those that are of interest in the sense of exhibiting significant dynamics in volume
and quality are those for which the conditions are met to be close to criticality.
B. Large deviation mechanism for superlinear production
The second class of mechanisms builds on the evidence of large deviations in the statistics
of the production activity R over the whole population of contributors and over the whole
life of the project. Figure 5 shows the complementary cumulative distribution P tot> (r) :=
Pr(R > r) of all contributions per developer over a long period for the Apache Web Server
project. One can observe an approximate power law tail dependence
P tot> (r) ∼ 1/r
µ , (2)
with µ ≈ 0.92. Within the epidemic framework presented in the next section, P tot> (r) will be
shown to be equivalent to the statistics of the cluster sizes of contributions following critical
cascades [31] [see expression (8)]. This result, showed for the Apache Web Server project, is
representative of the distributions found in other collaborative projects.
In the presence of such a power law statistics of contributions characterized by an expo-
nent µ < 1, we show below that the sum of contributions over all developers is controlled by
extreme contributors. The contributions made by these exceptional members of the group
are also responsible for the observed superlinear behavior given by (1). This mechanism is
reminiscent of the improved group performance that results from the presence of one or few
surperforming individuals [32]. In this case, the largest contributor provides a finite fraction
of the whole production over a given time period. This largest contributor (i.e. the “large
deviation”) has a superlinear contribution in the group size [33, 34]. In this situation, the
increasing productive activity results from a large heterogeneity of activity per individual.
And the more contributors c during a production period, the more likely it is to find an
extremely large contribution.
Specifically, starting from expression (2) for the complementary cumulative distribution
P tot> (r), we denote p(r) ∼ 1/r
1+µ the corresponding probability density function obtained
as the derivative of P tot> (r). Let us call {R1, R2, ..., Rc−1, Rc}, the total number of commits
8contributed respectively by the developers 1, 2, ..., c− 1, c. Let us call Rmax(c), the largest
among the set {R1, R2, ..., Rc−1, Rc}. A good estimate of Rmax(c) is obtained by the condition
that the probability
∫ +∞
Rmax(c)
p(r)dr to find a developer with a total contribution equal to or
larger than Rmax(c) times the number c of active developers is equal to 1, i.e., by the
definition of Rmax(c), there should be typically only one developer with such a number of
commits. This yields
Rmax(c) ∼ c
1/µ . (3)
An estimate of the typical total number of commits R1+R2+ ...+Rc contributed by the
c developers can then be obtained as [33, 34]
R1 + R2 + ... +Rc ≈ c
∫ Rmax(c)
0
rp(r)dr ∼ c1/µ , for µ < 1 . (4)
We stress that the scaling ∼ c1/µ only holds for µ < 1 and is replaced by ∼ c, i.e., linear-
ity, for µ > 1. The upper bound in the integral in (4) reflects that the random variables
{R1, R2, ..., Rc−1, Rc} are not larger than Rmax(c) by definition of the later. According to
equation (4), the typical total production (number of commits) by c developers is propor-
tional to c1/µ, when their contributions are wildly distributed with a power law distribution
with exponent µ < 1. According to this large deviation mechanism, the superlinear exponent
β is equal to 1/µ.
prediction of the large deviation mechanism : β = 1/µ , for µ < 1 . (5)
Within this large deviation mechanism, explaining the superlinear productive activity
(β > 1) reduces to explaining the heavy-tailed distribution of commits R per contributor
over a large period of time, i.e., amounts to derive the power law distribution (2) with µ < 1.
For this, the next section proposes a generic model.
C. Cascading model of productive activity
Both the interaction-based and the large deviations mechanisms can be captured together
by a generic cascade process, which is well described by the excited Hawkes conditional
Poisson process [35]. The Hawkes process typically captures well a variety of social dynamics
involving complex human interactions such as online viral meme propagation [28], gangs and
9crime in large American cities [36], cyber crime [37] and financial contagion [38–40]. The
Hawkes process is defined by the intensity I(t) of events (commits) given by
I(t) = λ(t) +
∑
i|tt<t
fiφ(t− ti) , (6)
where {ti, i = 1, 2, ...} are the timestamps of past commits, λ(t) is the spontaneous exogenous
rate of commits, fi is the fertility of commit i that quantifies the number of commits (of first
generation) that it can potentially trigger directly, and φ(t− ti) is the memory kernel, whose
integral is normalized to 1, which weights how much past commit activities influence future
ones. φ typically reflects how tasks are prioritized and performed by individuals according
to a rational economy where time is a non storable resource [41]. Expression (6) expresses
that the number of commits contributed between time t and t+ dt results from two sources:
(i) an exogenous source λ(t)dt representing the spontaneous commits not related to previous
commits; (ii) an endogenous term represented by the sum over all commits that were made
prior to t, and which are susceptible to trigger future commits. An obvious triggering
mechanism is debugging: a past commit may attract the attention of a developer who fixes
a bug and thus improves the code. Another triggering mechanism by which a previous
commit may trigger a future commit is when the former enables new functionalities and
relationships that open novel options for the developers. The Hawkes model is the simplest
conditional Poisson process that combines both exogeneity and endogeneity.
The class of Hawkes models can be mapped onto the general class of branching processes
[42]. The statistical average fertility 〈fi〉 defines the branching ratio n, which is the key
parameter. For n < 1, n = 1 and n > 1, the process is respectively sub-critical, critical and
super-critical [43, 44]. In the sub-critical regime (n < 1), the average activity tends to die
out exponentially fast and the exogenous source term λ(t) controls the overall dynamics. At
criticality (n = 1), on average one commit is triggered in direct lineage by a previous commit,
corresponding to a marginal sustainability of the process with infinitesimal exogenous inputs.
The super-critical regime (n > 1) is characterised by an explosive activity that can occur
with finite probability. Interpreting a cluster or connected cascade in a given branching
process of triggered contributions as the burst of production in a group of developers, the
distribution of contributions is thus mapped onto that of triggered cluster sizes [31].
Let us define the complementary cumulative distribution P 1st> (r) of contributions (number
of commits) per developer directly triggered by a given past commit, which can be called
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first-generation daughter commits generated by a mother commit. Consider the case where
P 1st> (r) is also a power law
P 1st> (r) ∼
1
rγ
. (7)
Close to or at criticality, the distribution of cluster sizes, which is equivalent to the distribu-
tion of productive activity P (r > R) given by (2) has an exponent µ = 1/2 [45], under the
condition that the distribution P 1st> (r) of contribution sizes triggered directly by previous
contributions (so-called first-generation cascades) decays sufficiently fast, i.e., with γ ≥ 2.
The result µ = 1/2 holds also for any distribution P 1st> (r) decaying asymptotically faster
than a power law [31]. When 1 < γ < 2, the mean field exponent µ = 1/2 is changed into
[31]
µ = 1/γ . (8)
Together with (5), the superlinear exponent β is predicted to be
β = 1/µ = γ, for 1 ≤ γ ≤ 2 , (9)
that is, equal the exponent γ of the tail distribution of first generation contributions per
developers. For γ > 2, µ = 2 and therefore β = 2. An analytical derivation of the prediction
(9) using the Hawkes process (6) that anchors rigorously the large deviation argument of
Section IIIB is given by Saichev and Sornette [46].
Figure 6 synthesizes the relation between superlinear productive activity, (critical) cas-
cades, the distribution of first-generation triggering and the total distribution of activity per
contributors over a sufficient long period.
D. Empirical tests
We now turn to empirical tests of this theory. For each 250 days period, we have calibrated
the power law tails of two distributions:
1. the distribution of the total number r of commits per contributor over the 250 days,
which is taken as a proxy for P tot> (r), with exponent µ;
2. the distribution of the number of commits per developer per 5 days time bin, which
is assumed to be a reasonable proxy for the distribution P 1st> (r) of the first generation
production characterized by the exponent γ.
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For each OSS project, we have used the discrete maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) with
a p-value threshold p > 0.1, obtained by bootstrapping, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov Distance
KS < 0.15 to select the ranges over which the calibration is performed [47].
Figure 5 shows the result for the Apache Web Server project. The fitting procedure
qualifies the existence of a power law tail for the two empirical distributions with estimated
exponents respectively equal to µ = 0.92 ± 0.1 and γ ≈ 1.28 ± 0.1. These values with
their error bars are compatible with the prediction (8) µ = 1/γ, resulting from the cascades
of triggering [31]. This result is typical of the other investigated OSS projects, as shown
Figure 7, albeit with a considerable variability. This is expected since the projects are likely
to be characterized by many more dimensions that the production and cascading effects
considered here.
Figure 7 presents β as a function of γ (panel A) and 1/µ as a function of γ (panel B)
for all the OSS projects on our database, According to the cascading model of productive
activity of Section IIIC, we should have β = γ = 1/µ, according to (9). Indeed, one can
see that β, γ, and 1/µ are clustered around ≈ 4/3. Almost half of the considered periods
(184 of a total of 390) fitted over all projects belong to the regime where 1 < β < 2 and
1 < γ < 2 (panel A) and forty percent (86 out of 213) are such that 1 < 1/µ < 2 (panel B)
as predicted by the theory.
Let us first focus on the relationship between 1/µ and γ shown in panel B of Figure 7.
Note that the statistics on the exponent µ is significantly smaller compared to that for γ
simply because we obtain one data point over each 250 day periods for µ compared with
one data point per 5 days time bin for γ. The shaded square represents the domain over
which the theory applies (86 over 213 data points). To test quantitatively the relation
1/µ = γ, we used a Gaussian bivariate distribution model. The dotted ellipses show the
first three standard deviations equi-levels around the barycenter 1/µ ≈ γ ≈ 4/3 and the
black line represents the principal axis of the bi-Gaussian model. We also performed a
principal component analysis (PCA). The red dotted lines show the two main directions of
the variance obtained with the PCA. Both methods support a positive correlation between
β and γ with slope ≈ 1.02 with the bi-Gaussian approach and ≈ 1.47 with PCA. To our
knowledge, this may be the first empirical test ever of the renormalization of the exponent
γ of first generation events into the renormalized exponent µ = 1/γ due to the cascade of
triggering over all generation in a critical branching process [31, 45].
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The evidence for the relationship between β and γ is presented in panel A of Figure
7. First, one can observe a prevalence of the large-deviation critical interaction regime
as the grey square area delimited by 1 ≤ γ, β ≤ 2 is very densely populated (184 out of
390). Second, as already pointed out, the barycenter of the cloud of data points is on
β ≈ γ ≈ 4/3, as expected from theory. However, we find limited support for a clear
linear relation between β and γ. The bi-Gaussian model analysis provides the three dotted
ellipses showing the first three standard deviations away from the barycenter. The black line
representing the main axis of the bi-Gaussian model suggests a negative correlation between
β and γ. Using a PCA analysis, we find a positive relationship on the second principal
component, with slope ≈ 1.24. These results suggest that very productive projects and
periods within projects, characterized by a large superlinear exponent β, are likely to be
due to more complex interactions between the developers and their mutual triggering that
assumed by the simple theory developed above. In particular, differentiation between same-
developer commit triggering and inter-developer commit triggering seem necessary along the
lines of Refs. [19, 48].
IV. RECONCILING PRESENT FINDINGS AND SUPERLINEAR
PRODUCTION IN LARGE CITIES
Figure 8 reveals that the clouds of superlinear production exponent β exhibit an interest-
ing regularity as a function of the total number of contributors N of an OSS project. The
intuition motivating this investigation is the following. While a minimum critical mass of
contributors is needed to foster productive bursts, large projects suffer from coordination
costs, which may offset the increasing return of productive activity. Figure 8 (panel A) shows
indeed that the superlinear exponent β decreases on average with the size of the projects .
Panel B demonstrates that, for projects of up to 33 contributors, the number of 250 days
periods with β > 1 (superlinear regime) increases as a function of the total number N of
developers, approximately according to
(ratio of time windows with β > 1) ∼ 1.37 log10N . (10)
For N > 33, a different regime occurs characterized by a much smaller ratio of the time
periods with superlinear productivity (β > 1). Taken together, the two panels of Figure 8
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support the view that superlinear productivity is the appanage of relatively small projects
with no more than 30-40 developers in total, while larger groups face the difficult challenge
of creating and maintaining productive bursts. The data is too scattered unfortunately to
allow us to draw a firm conclusion on the value(s) that β converges towards for large project
sizes.
There may be a link between our results and a previous study reporting the phenomenon
of superlinearity on a completely different class of objects, namely cities. Data from 360 US
metropolitan areas have shown that wages, number of patents, GDP and intensity of crime
scale superlinearly with population size [production ∼ (population)β ] with an exponent
β ≈ 1.15 [49, 50]. The value of β larger than 1 reflects the fact that productivity increases
by about 11% with each doubling in population [51]. Qualitatively in line with our findings,
the superlinearity found in our OSS data is significantly stronger (β ≈ 4/3 on average, with
large variations and some projects being characterised by much larger β’s) for the smaller
projects with no more than 30-40 developers. We note that our results apply to a completely
different range of group sizes compared with the results for cities involving population of
tens of thousand to tens of millions inhabitants.
The underlying mechanisms are perhaps different [52]. For cities, the superlinear scaling
in urban productivity demonstrates the importance of cities as centers of enhanced interac-
tions, leading to generation and exchange of knowledge and exploitation of innovations [51].
For the OSS projects, many other factors come into play, such as the role of diversity and
complementarity, which describes the fact that doing more of one thing increases the return
to doing more of another. Other possible mechanisms include synergies, economies of scale,
coordination and leadership, role model and entrainment effect, motivations, friendship and
other psychological factors. However, Figure 8 suggests that these mechanisms dampen out
as the project size becomes very large, possibly leaving only those still active at the level of
city sizes.
Expanding on the remark on the different sizes involved in our OSS database compared
with cities, we present a simple mechanism and theoretical argument that may explain the
smaller value of the superlinear exponent for cities, deriving it from our results obtained for
small group sizes. The key idea is that the population of a city can be partitioned into many
groups of persons interacting closely within a group and loosely or not at all across groups.
Groups can be firms, or department within firms, clubs, and other organisations through
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which people interact. We assume that, within each group, the superlinear production law
(1) holds with the exponent β ≈ 4/3 found in our OSS database.
The second ingredient is that group sizes g are widely distributed, roughly as Zipf’s law
[15],
p(g) ∼
1
g1+z
, (11)
where p(g) is the probability density function of the group sizes g, z = 1 if Zipf’s law holds
exactly, while in general z can deviate from 1 for a variety of reasons [16]. Let us assume
that a city of total population N is constituted of n groups, respectively with memberships
of N1, N2, ..., Nn individuals. The total production of the city is then, according to (1),
R(N) = Nβ1 +N
β
2 + ...+N
β
n , (12)
assuming for the moment and for simplicity that β is independent of group sizes. R(N) in
expression (12) can be estimated as [33, 34]
R(N) ∼ n
∫ gmax(n)
1
gβ p(g)dg , (13)
where gmax(n) is the largest group size among the n groups, which can be estimated by
n
∫ ∞
gmax(n)
p(g)dg ∼ 1 → gmax(n) ∼ n
z . (14)
By conservation and assuming for simplicity no strong overlap between the groups, we have
approximately
N1 +N2 + . . .+Nn = N ∼ n
∫ gmax(n)
1
g p(g)dg . (15)
This leads to n ∼ N for z > 1 and n ∼ N z for z < 1. In words, a relatively thin tail of the
group size distribution (z > 1) is associated with a number of group scaling proportionally
to the total city population N . In contrast, for a heavy tailed distribution (z < 1), the
number of groups scales sublinearly with N , as the few largest groups account for a finite
fraction of total population. Reporting in expression (13), this yields R(N) ∼ N b, with the
exponent b obeying three possible regimes.
1. z ≤ 1 implies b = β: the same superlinear production exponent defines the whole city
production as a function of its population as does the production of each independent
group. The mechanism is clear: for z < 1, a few single largest groups dominate the
n-partition and account for the majority of the city population. The same scaling
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holds essentially because the city is almost controlled by a single group and we have
assumed the same exponent β for all groups. The empirical evidence suggests that
this case does not apply.
2. 1 < z < β implies b = β/z. In this regime, there are still very large groups that
contribute to the superlinearity but their relative numbers is much less than for z ≤ 1.
The values β = 4/3 with b = 1.15 can be reconciled with z = β/b ≈ 1.16. This
exponent is, with error bounds, roughly compatible with the value found for firms in
the US, close to 1.25 [53].
3. 1 < β < z implies b = 1, which corresponds to a linear growth of production of the
city with its population. In this regime, the overall city production is controlled by
the many small groups constituting the city and there are no scale effects other than
a proportionality with the number of small groups.
While this argument is quite naive, it demonstrates the importance of the interplay
between partitions of cities in groups, the corresponding productivity of such groups and
the size distribution of these groups. A similar story is likely to be relevant in large OSS
projects, groups and firms, which for a variety of reasons ranging from cognitive limitations
[54] to efficiency maximization [55] are found to organize in subgroups, often in a hierarchical
way [54].
V. DISCUSSION
In the early days of the industrial revolution, Adam Smith noted how the successive
efficiency gains of communication means have helped reach unprecedented pools of resources
and how they have unlocked some limitations of the labor market through improved division
of labor [56]. The telegraph, telephone and more recently the Internet have further pushed
back the possibilities for knowledge production and for labor organizations on the model of
collective action [57]. Nowadays, unrelated people spontaneously team up across the world
in open collaboration projects and join forces to create knowledge in the form of software,
natural language [58], mathematics [59] as well as for the production of tangible goods [60].
These organizations rely primarily on the principles of peer-production [61]: (i) task self-
selection, (ii) peer-review and (iii) iterative improvement, at odds with traditional market
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and firm production organizations [62]. Expertise can be timely and rightly pulled from
a broader community towards efficient problem resolution. The present understanding of
group performance in social psychology goes in the same direction: experiments involving
small groups performing coordination tasks [8, 63], problem solving [32] and innovation [14]
support the hypothesis that larger groups perform better because more diverse cognitive
abilities can be pooled. Group productive activity can also be more than the sum of their
parts if members develop social sensitivity among each others [20]. However, the marginal
gain of having more individuals in a group decreases rapidly to be negligible beyond five
individuals [32, 64, 65]. Similarly, as projects attract larger communities, more coordination
is required through social norms and formal governance structures[21], which may in turn
reduce the positive effects of peer-production [66].
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown that productive bursts, associated with increasing return
of activity, result from the mechanism of critical triggering of commits among contributors.
Such critical triggering may operate according two co-existing mechanisms: interactions
and large deviations. These mechanisms have been falsified in three independent ways : (i)
documenting the superlinear relationship between productive activity R and the number
of active contributors c characterized by the scaling exponent 1 < β < 2; (ii) measuring
the power law tail distribution of first generation cascades with exponent 1 < γ < 2 and
checking that it explains the superlinear productivity exponent β; and (iii) measuring the
power law tail distribution of production cluster sizes with exponent µ and verifying that it
is approximately equal to the 1/γ, where γ is the distribution of contributions per developer
at short times.
We have found that superlinear productive activity holds for a broad range of project sizes
and types, with a slight decrease of the average scaling exponent β with the total number of
contributors N . The frequency of productive bursts occurrence in projects has been found
to be very large for N ≤ 33 compared with larger projects. The results suggest that size and
threshold effects have an influence on the ability to trigger and maintain critical triggering of
individual contributions. Indeed, contributions must create enough reaction opportunities
to trigger on average as many downward contributions. Pervasive communication systems
17
(social networks), physical proximity (e.g. cities), or even personal dedication to the project
surely help increase opportunities for a contribution to trigger a follow up action. On
the other hand, large and complex structures with overwhelming communication loads or
inadequate governance structure can inhibit the ripe circulation and reuse of knowledge for
the sake of further cumulative innovation. The large deviation mechanism provides another
take-away lesson: open collaboration does not imply equal work between contributors. On
the contrary, productive bursts are the hallmark of a minority of individual engagement with
intense interactions and short-lived contributions of far above average sizes. Whether these
large deviation contributions pull engagement by others or on the contrary are pushed by
the community remains an open question to be elucidated.
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slope ≈ - 1.43 
FIG. 1: Distribution of project sizes in our sample quantified by their total number of developers. The
distribution follows approximately a power law with exponent α ≈ 1.4, with an apparent deviation in the
tail possibly resulting from an over-sampling bias of large projects. The bend down for small projects is
likely the result of an under-sampling bias.
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FIG. 2: Typical time series of open source software development (e.g. Apache Web Server) with active
contributors (green area) and their productive activity (red area). For clarity, the time series are represented
in logarithmic scale and they have been smoothed with a rolling window of 45 days. Over the whole project
history, various epochs of productive activity can be found. The background grey areas indicate three levels
of the productivity exponent β defined by equation (1) (light grey for β < 1, grey for 1 6 β < 2 and dark
grey for β > 2) for time windows of 250 days. Blank areas show time windows for which β could not be
fitted, mainly because the numbers of active contributors (resp. commits) were strongly varying over these
periods. In other words, it is possible that super linear production was occurring in these periods but we
could not determined it.
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slope ≈ 1.19
Apache Web Server
FIG. 3: Scaling relation LOCs ∼ (Commits)δ between commits and lines of code. For the Apache Web
Server project, the scaling exponent is δ = 1.2 ± 0.2 (p < 0.01, R2 = 0.87). For the vast majority of
projects, the relation between lines of code and commits exhibits the same scaling with δ ' 1, suggesting
that we can use either commits or lines of codes, as both provide a consistent and therefore robust measure
of contribution (and in addition that commits may themselves result from cascades of code production.
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FIG. 4: Typical superlinear relation in double logarithmic scale of the productive contribution R as a
function of active contributors c per 5-day time windows for Apache Web Server (http://httpd.apache.org/).
The scaling exponent β ≈ 1.5 (p < 0.001 and R2 = 0.99) is shown as the slope of a straight line in
double logarithmic scale. The error bars show the 25th and 75th percentiles of contributors log-bins. Since
21.5 = 2.8, this explains the title of this paper.
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slope ≈ - 1.28 
slope ≈ - 0.92 
Apache Web Server
FIG. 5: (blue squares) Apache Web Server project: Complementary cumulative distribution P 1st> (r)
of contributions (number of commits) per developer and per 5-day time bins (1st generation daughters
events in the language of the epidemic branching process described in the text) with exponent γ ≈ 1.28.
(red circles) Complementary cumulative distribution P tot> (r) of all contributions per developer over a long
period of time. Ptot is equivalent to measuring the cluster sizes of contributions following critical cascades
(3). All distributions have been fitted using the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE). The distribution
of cascade size is characterised by the exponent ≈ 0.92 < 1 compared to the first generation daughter
events distribution with exponent γ ≈ 1.28. The results showed here for Apache are representative of the
distributions found in other collaborative projects.
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FIG. 6: (A) (light blue) Triggering mechanism generating the clusters of size with renormalized exponent
µ = 1/γ from the distribution of first generation “daughter events” with exponent γ. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we represented one cluster of activity per contributor, but triggering can occur between contributors
provided that the probability of triggering remains the same between all contributors. (B) (light green)
shows how the triggering mechanism generates superlinear productive activity A as a function of the number
of active contributors c.
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FIG. 7: (A) superlinear exponent β as a function of γ, the exponent of the power law tail distribution
of first generation productivity for each of the 250 days periods for which both values could be calibrated.
The points are concentrated around β ≈ γ ≈ 4/3 with almost half of them (184 over 390 values) within the
grey area delimited by 1 ≤ β ≤ 2 and 1 ≤ γ ≤ 2. To test for the relations β = γ and 1/µ = γ, we used
a bi-Gaussian model. The dotted ellipses show the first three standard deviations around the barycenters
and the black line represents the main axis with the bi-Gaussian model. We also performed a principal
component analysis (PCA). The red dotted lines show the main direction of variance obtained with the
PCA. Both methods show a positive relation between β and γ only on second principal component (slope
≈ 1.24 with PCA). (B) same as panel (A) for the dependence of 1/µ versus γ with a concentration of points
in the grey area (86 over 213 values ) and 1/µ ≈ γ ≈ 4/3. Both the bi-Gaussian fit and the PCA show
strong evidence of a positive relation with slope ≈ 1.02 with the bi-Gaussian approach and ≈ 1.47 with the
PCA
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FIG. 8: (A) Average superlinear exponent 〈β〉 per project as a function of the cumulative number of
contributors. The circle size reflects the number of exponents fitted per 250 days time window, for each
project and entering the average statistics. The sampling ranges from 1 (small disks) to 16 (largest disk).
〈β〉 exhibits a slightly negative slope ≈ −0.14 as a function of log
10
(N) (p < 0.1 and r = −0.17). (B) To
measure the prevalence of productive bursts in projects, we measure the ratio of periods with superlinear
exponent β > 1 over all 250 days periods for each project as a function of log
10
(N). We distinguish a
cluster of points around ≈ 0.3 and log
10
(N) ≈ 1.52 (i.e. N ≈ 33 contributors) with a positive relationship
(slope ≈ 1.37) of the Ratio as a function of log10(N). Projects with a large pool of contributors (N > 100)
are more randomly scattered with a lower ratio and do not obey the same relationship, suggesting a different
regime.
